BY GRAEME DOBELL

PNG’S 35 YEAR HISTORY as an independent state gives some cause for optimism about its minimum coping mechanisms. With all its problems and failings, PNG has worked.

Having completed seven post-independence national elections, the nation ‘retains its position as one of the few post-colonial states to have maintained an unbroken record of democratic government.’

The history that preceded independence points to the need for a certain Australian modesty in preaching to its former colony and nearest neighbour. Australia did a reasonable job in running PNG but until almost the last moment paid little attention to preparing it for nationhood. ‘Australia’s aim in PNG was not to build a state but to develop administrative machinery to facilitate continued Australian rule by replicating Australian institutions.’

Advice or urgings from Canberra will often be discounted in Port Moresby, precisely because they come from Canberra. Australia must always be among PNG’s closest friends, but proximity and friendship don’t always translate into an ability to influence the decisions made in Port Moresby. History and geography can both repel and attract.

The bilateral interests involved may be relatively constant, but the past decade saw significant changes in the shape, quality and intensity of Australia’s interactions with PNG and the Pacific islands.

Australia’s aid spending in the Pacific and PNG over the decade reflected a heavy emphasis on security and governance. In 1998–99, education ($103 million) and governance ($102 million) were the two top categories; by 2007–08, governance spending nearly quadrupled to $395 million. Education spending ended the period where it started, while health tripled to end at $118 million. For Australia in the Pacific, this was the decade of governance….

Australia’s geopolitical instinct in PNG and the South Pacific has always been one of strategic denial: the … nub of this bipartisan policy is that no other power must ever gain any military foothold or control in the countries of the Australian Arc. This is the Australian historical instinct at its most basic.

And, as in the past, Australia might be able to deny other players military bases in the region, but it can’t deny the influence, access and economic power that external powers are always able to exert on PNG and the islands.

The members of the Arc obviously don’t like being grouped together in this way. Because of its size, PNG is especially resentful of being nominated for membership. But from the Australian perspective, a range of similar, Melanesian-style problems run through the countries of the Arc….

Having long argued that Australia can’t have an exit strategy from its own region, Canberra has adopted the approach of melding historical and modern sensibilities, even if the Pacific policy produced isn’t necessarily consistent or coherent. In this, it shares some traits with our earlier role in PNG.

PNG’s golden era: political and security challenges in PNG and their implications for Australia Australia’s activist sentiments—as interventionist or partner—come from its own deepest strategic instincts but also from a genuine effort to make a difference, not to depart.

PNG will always be central to Australia’s Pacific policy. For the Australia–PNG partnership to work, it requires PNG’s understanding of Australian interests as well as acceptance of Australia’s help.

Just as importantly, it needs an Australia that understands the limits of what it can do in PNG, while always seeking to appreciate what PNG is saying about what it needs and wants.

Graeme Dobell, a journalist for 40 years, writes on Australian and international politics, foreign affairs, defence and the Asia Pacific

Source: ‘PNG’s golden era: political and security challenges in PNG and their implications for Australia’ in Policy Analysis, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2011   www.aspi.org.au

Spotter: Bill McGrath