The argument for the Ombudsman Commission to be given power to prosecute cases it investigates is not new. It has been around for some time.

The disbanded Investigative Task Force Sweep, a non-constitutional corruption fighting body established through a national executive council decision, was vested with a wide range of powers including investigating and prosecuting cases.

ITFS performed extremely well, resulting in some prominent citizens ending up behind bars. Two who come to mind are politician Paul Tientsen and businessman Ezekial Wartoto, now serving jail terms.

Among the key attributes of the success of ITFS was that it took a collaborative approach under one umbrella. Investigators and prosecutors worked cooperatively under one organisation which provided them the advantage of intimate discussion, common strategy and unified execution.

The recent five men Supreme Court decision quashing the case surrounding the aforementioned misconduct charges against Peter O’Neill showed the Ombudsman Commission in need of teeth or alternatively an amalgamation of the Ombudsman and Public Prosecution offices.

The Ombudsman, as an independent and reputable constitutional office, has thoroughly and diligently investigated the UBS loan case. In its intelligence and wisdom, it concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the prime minister had a case to answer.

It subsequently referred the case to the public prosecutor.

The public prosecutor, vested with prosecutorial authority, had the prerogative to refer the charges to the Chief Justice to set up a leadership tribunal or to not prosecute having formed a compelling reason to ditch the case.

However, it seems that the public prosecutor questioned the wisdom of the Ombudsman Commission and changed the specifics of the charges referred to him, effectively redesigning them so that they favour the alleged perpetrator.

This has raised serious questions about the independence and integrity of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and brought into question the entire investigative and prosecutorial process.

The public prosecutor erred by writing to the Ombudsman Commission requesting more evidence, an action that questioned the intelligence and wisdom of the Ombudsman Commission and undermined its efforts.

Did Kalwin Pondros really need more evidence or was he just buying time because he had other motives?

Equally important, does the office of the public prosecutor have the power to write to the Ombudsman Commission seeking more evidence? I have been reliably told that Kalwin Pondros does not have the power to do that.

Moreover, Kalwin Pondros was reported to have amended the original charges referred to him by the Ombudsman Commission and wrote to the prime minister about charges he had designed which were not the original misconduct charges referred to him.

This seems to be a blatant abuse of power which deprives the people of Papua New Guinea of due justice.

Any clear-thinking person would conclude that the action of Kalwin Pondros paved the way for the decision the five man Supreme Court bench eventually meted out in the case.

A very bad precedent was set in a high profile case for a very important office, and corrective and deterrent action is imperative.

The Ombudsman Commission must take these actions to the same court for a judicial review of the part Kalwin Pondros played in this case and to see if there is an avenue available to resurrect the UBS loan case under a different public prosecutor.

To avoid duplication of duties in the costly and lengthy process of investigation and referral, the two constitutional offices must be amalgamated into one entity for one stop shopping.

The Ombudsman Commission and the Constitutional Review Commission should look into developing a legislative framework to bring the Ombudsman Commission and public prosecution offices into one entity with a modus operandi similar to that of the disbanded Task Force Sweep.