In this thesis, I  look at colonial processes  of  pacification in the Eastern  Highlands of Papua New Guinea, and establish the  causal mechanisms that lead to  the elimination of indigenous warfare  between  the  late  1940s  and  the  mid-1960s.

I not only document and  analyse  these processes  in  detail,  but  also  develop  a  methodological  and  analytical  toolkit  to  compare processes  of  pacification in general, and an encompassing theoretical framework to explain the gradual but ultimately successful transition to a colonially induced peace. 

The  thesis  centres  on  four  communities  in  three  ethnic  groups  in  the  Okapa  and  Obura-Wonenara Districts of the Eastern Highlands Province in Papua New Guinea, namely Purosa among  the  Fore,  Amaira  among  the  Auyana,  and  Bibeori  and  Obura  among  the  Southern Tairora.

All of these communities were first contacted between 1947 and 1949 by government patrols  of  the  Australian  Administration. 

The  ensuing  process  of  pacification  has  been  far from  uniform,  however. 

While  indigenous  warfare  ceased  quickly  among  the  Fore  and Auyana, it persisted for a much longer  period  among  the  Southern  Tairora.  These temporal variations and the differing outcomes form an ideal setting to compare different trajectories of pacification and extract general features conducive to the elimination of warfare.

Using a combination of  documentary  and archival sources from  the  colonial administration, published  ethnographic  information  and  own  fieldwork  data,  oral  history  interviews  with villagers  in  the Eastern  Highlands  as  well  as  former  colonial officers,  I  trace  in detail  the complex circumstances and preconditions of the processes of pacification as they occurred in the four communities.

I document the interests  and strategies of the different colonial agents trying to implement a ban on warfare or contributing  to  this  process,  analyse  the  impact  of these strategies on the local  groups,  and  investigate the cultural perceptions,  interpretations, reactions and strategies of the members of these groups in interacting with agents of the state.

In  Purosa,  a  desire  for  goods  brought  in  by  the  colonial  officers,  a  desire  fuelled  by  cargo cults and a  general  climate of uncertainty,  rapid  change and new  possibilities  led to a  quick cessation of warfare by the people themselves.

Once peace was established, it was the village leaders’ adoption of village-level courts to peacefully settle conflicts that sustained this rapid pacification.

As leadership  among the Fore was  not solely dependent  on prowess in warfare like in the other case studies, but also on the organisation of alliances and peace ceremonies, it was the leaders’ legacy as peacemakers that facilitated their transformation into mediators and adjudicators to keep the peace. 

In Amaira, the strategically precarious situation between two  enemies and the  resulting high death toll, coupled with the reputation of police as fierce warriors, led to the local population asking  for  the stationing of a policeman in their village for protection against enemy raids.

This ensuing  constant police presence and the heavy-handed repression of the police quickly curtailed any further violence. After the police were withdrawn, it was again the leadership of village officials who emulated the  police and held police-style courts,  which guaranteed that conflicts  no  longer  escalated. 

A  rapid  involvement  in  the  colonial  economy  and  the abandoning of traditions associated with  warfare  due  to the presence of mission  evangelists also made the recurrence of collective violence less likely. 

In Obura, pacification came late and only through systematic repression and a continued state presence.  There  were  less  conduits of information  that  prompted  expectations  of  wealth  or security from enemies  to be possibly gained  from collaboration with  state agents.

Excessive and unsystematic state  violence  also proved to be  detrimental to the process  of pacification. Village  officials  did  not  cooperate  in  settling  conflicts  or  arresting  troublemakers,  and continued to be primarily war leaders  that  often  initiated  retaliation  against enemies.

It was only after a government station was set up in Obura that warfare eventually slowed down, as retaliation in the form of arrests by the police was now more systematic and swift. 

In Bibeori, people welcomed an  early  presence  of  mission evangelists, as the connection to these outsiders perceived as powerful allowed them  to regain their original territory lost in a previous war.

The  people of Bibeori attempted  to remain allies of  the administration, but as they were situated in an area in which conflicts continued to escalate to warfare, they at times had to resort  to  violence to defend  themselves. 

This shows that  pacification  could only take hold if all groups in an area gave up warfare at the same time. Violent repression by the state and  the  unavailability  of  alternative  institutions  for  the  settlement  of  conflicts  led  to  the development  of  soccer  matches  as  an  incomplete  form  of  restorative  justice,  allowing  for dissipation of tensions resulting from conflicts and a normalization of relations, albeit with an inherent danger of violent escalation. 

In  comparing  the  four  case  studies  I  show  that  there  are  three  decisive  conditions  for pacification:

1)  a  strategy  of repression that  punishes  groups  still  engaged in warfare;

2)  a strategy of incentives that rewards  groups  willing  to cease war; and

3) the  establishment  of judicial institutions that  enable the peaceful settlement  of conflicts between  pacified groups.

These strategies would ultimately reverse the incentive structures to pursue warfare as a form of  retaliation,  and  over  time  guarantee  lasting peace. 

While  the  Australian  Administration employed all of these strategies  to varying degrees, it was the perspective and agency of the local  population  that  made  the  difference.  Pre-contact  conditions,  such  as  modalities  and intensity of warfare, patterns  of  leadership and alliance, as  well  as traditional institutions of peace-making also shaped the process of pacification.

Political  decision-making within local groups led to different strategies of interaction with the colonial agents, ranging from violent resistance  to  avid  acceptance  of  the  proclaimed  ban  of  warfare.

Only  when  the  villagers perceived repression as systematic and impartial, only when they welcomed selective rewards and  only  after they  widely  accepted  alternative institutions  of  conflict  settlement,  did they stop waging war.

And it was  in  areas  where  local leaders started to settle conflicts  on  their own  in  courts  styled  after  the  courts  of  the  Australian  Administration  that  an  initial  end  of warfare was turned into a lasting peace.

This demonstrates that it is crucial to investigate local cultural  understandings  and  epistemologies,  as  it  is  the  culturally  patterned  agency  of indigenous  actors  that  determines  not  only  resistance  to  the  imposition  of  state  control,  but also the sometimes quick, sometimes delayed cessation of warfare.