Campbell went on to say that the United States has not done enough to engage with the island countries, while Australia and New Zealand have done plenty.

He called on the United States to “substantially up our game” and said he looked “to Australia to lead.”

The seven-decade-long alliance between Australia and the United States has seen profound changes with the addition of AUKUS.

The Pacific presents another set of challenges for the alliance, which are important both for the alliance itself and in the broader context of strategic competition.

Failure to effectively manage these new challenges will have profound repercussions for both the United States and Australia.

Two related questions emerge — how can the United States raise its game among the Pacific Island countries, while at the same time building on the foundations laid by its long-time ally, Australia?

The Biden administration has an opportunity to build on the steps taken by the previous administration and deepen US engagement in the Pacific.

Improving US engagement with these fragile island states, while enhancing collaboration with Australia as a key regional ally, will serve as proof positive that the United States is able to successfully shift its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific.

Failure to effectively improve US regional involvement in Oceania will be a failure of American will, with broader implications.

An essential element to US engagement is a durable strategy uniquely aligned to the needs of the small Pacific Island states.

Over the past decade, two issues — climate change and strategic competition — have animated American interest in the Pacific, the latter the more significantly.

US Pacific Island strategy should be informed by the Pacific Islands Forum Boe Declaration, which endorses a commitment to the rules-based international order and upholds the right of member countries to conduct their “national affairs free of external interference and coercion.”

Importantly, the declaration also promotes both a traditional and non-traditional view of security, emphasising human, environmental and cybersecurity, as well as concern over transnational crime.

These are the areas in which the United States can most productively collaborate with Australia to enhance security among the Pacific Island countries.

China’s apparent desire to expand its military capability among the Pacific Islands has raised concerns in both Australia and the United States.

China has announced plans to improve an airfield on the coral atoll of Katon in Kiribati, which is roughly 3,000 kilometers from Oahu and lies near the sea lanes connecting Hawaii with Australia and New Zealand.

Elsewhere, China has completed work on improving Momote Airport on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, which is the closest airfield to Lombrum Naval Base.

Australia, the United States, and Papua New Guinea are collaborating on upgrading Lombrum, originally built by the US Navy in World War II and rivalling Pearl Harbor in size and capacity.

China has also reportedly sought basing opportunities in Vanuatu and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. While these efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, US officials clearly remain worried.

Beyond basing rights, China could well seek to emulate American Pacific arrangements and negotiate its own compact of free association with, for example, Kiribati.

In September 2019, the Trump administration cancelled US involvement in the Paris Agreement on climate change.

The Paris agreement had broadly been seen as a victory for Pacific Island diplomacy, and the US withdrawal was met with disappointment.

Tuvalu’s prime minister, Enele Sopoaga, said, “We are very, very distressed,” and Fiji’s prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, said that the “loss of America’s leadership was unfortunate.”

Climate change threatens American islands just as much as it threatens Tuvalu and Fiji, and recognising this is an essential step to creating a lasting Pacific Island strategy.

Yet, strategic competition creates even greater urgency as the United States embraces a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Once again, America has an interest in maintaining the international rules-based order as much as the Pacific Island countries do.

In embracing America’s Pacific Island identity, US policymakers should listen to American Pacific Island voices, giving greater durability to American involvement with the Pacific Islands.

There are five steps that the United States should take to improve security cooperation.

First, it should continue to adapt Pacific Deterrence Initiative projects to better align with the realities of the Pacific Island countries.

Second, Washington should move forward on funding the compacts of free association with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.

Third, Congress should legislate for deeper and more reliable cooperation and collaboration with allies and partners regarding the Pacific Island states.

Fourth, Congress should embrace the language for interagency working groups found in the Maritime SAFE Act and incorporate that into other non-traditional security cooperation legislation.

Finally, the United States should improve the management of these policies and legislation through the appointment of a Pacific coordinator.

Taken together, these five steps would make significant advances in US engagement and involvement in the Pacific Islands.

By creating a strategy predicated on durable engagement, the United States would position itself in the region with a rationale inclusive of strategic competition but also stretching to areas of non-traditional security concerns.

Alan Tidwell is professor of the practice and director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in Washington DC