Commanders in the field typically clash with staff officers who are charged with planning a campaign.

But, because the military planners tend to have different perspectives about what is happening and what can realistically be achieved, their instructions and advice can clash with the assessments of those commanders doing the fighting.

Some generals seek to reduce the level of disconnect by insisting that they and their key staff venture to the front line to gain firsthand knowledge of what is happening.

Generals Erwin Rommel and George Patton were exemplars of this form of leadership and management.

Of course, this necessarily puts senior officers in harm’s way and some end up being killed.

Notable examples of this include Wehrmacht General Georg Stumme, killed while undertaking a reconnaissance mission during the second Battle of El Alamein, US Lieutenant General Simon Buckner, killed at Okinawa doing the same thing, and at least five Russian generals killed in the continuing Russo-Ukraine War.

As a rule, armies don't like generals being killed and visits to the frontlines are not encouraged. It is judged better to send more junior and expendable officers to do the more risky tasks.

Within a large public sector bureaucracy there is much less risk for executive leaders mixing with frontline staff, although this still tends to be infrequent.

The consequent risks of a disconnect arising is real unless the executive leadership has firsthand knowledge of the situation at the organisation’s operational level.

In Colonel Murray's case, he was dealing with people far away in Canberra who largely had no idea of the circumstances that confronted him.

Worse still they seemed disinclined, and even uninterested, in acquiring at least a rudimentary knowledge of what was happening in PNG.

Superimpose on this situation Murray's apparent lack of the political skills required to operate effectively within such a system and the opportunities for miscommunication and misunderstanding are unlimited.

I have worked in a large bureaucracy managing a health system employing 40,000 people and scattered over the state of South Australia covering an area of a million square kilometres.

At one time, some organisational genius decided that an entirely new executive team was needed to 'fix' the health system.

The government duly appointed five senior executive positions with people who had no firsthand knowledge or experience in the operation and management of the hospital system they were meant to 'fix'.

You will guess the results of this bold but fatally flawed endeavour.

Four years later the problems had multiplied and the executives were replaced by people who had managed hospitals and understood how they worked.

It seems to me that the case of the External Territories departmental secretary, JR Halligan, being expected to buttress the work of PNG Administrator JK Murray by providing him with policies and plans, epitomised the errors inherent in such a situation.

Halligan had neither the knowledge, skills nor inclination to provide effective advice about a land largely incomprehensible to him in far away Canberra.

Many former kiaps like me will recall the apparent inability of Canberra to understand anything about PNG, including our role and functions. Indeed, their ignorance became something of a standing joke.

Of course, it was not really funny because it had real world consequences, not least in the stampede towards independence triggered by the Whitlam government's desire to be rid of its unwanted and embarrassing role as a colonial power.

The pursuit of the political objective of early independence made irrelevant the experience and knowledge of the kiaps and other colonial field officers and the fears and ignorance of many Papua New Guineans about what independence might mean for all but a tiny elite.

It is arguable that this mismatch between Canberra and the colonial headquarters at Konedobu has had a profound impact upon PNG's governance and development ever since.

The problems experienced by JK Murray persisted long after he passed from the scene and doubtless will continue to persist into the future.

It is an awfully long way from Canberra to Waigani in more ways than the 3,000 kilometers than separate them.